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2Introduction
Shocks and stresses are part and parcel of development pathways. 
Economies must withstand the impacts of conflict, natural hazards 
and climate change and resulting impacts on their financial, 
political and trade systems. In 2014, for example, 10.7 million more 
people were adversely affected by natural hazards across the globe 
than in 2013, and the number of displaced people due to conflict 
and persecution in the same year reached 59.5 million (GHA, 2015; 
UNHCR, 2015). These short-term shocks or long-term stressors – 
such as creeping changes in rainfall and average temperatures – can 
have real and lasting impacts that frustrate and even undermine the 
development and economic growth of nations and communities. 
Such shocks affect the development process via their impacts on 
education, health and economic productivity. However, shocks and 
stresses also have the potential to inform development progress. 
The Bangladesh cyclone of 1991, one of the deadliest on record, for 
example, triggered subsequent investments in cyclone shelters and 
early warning systems. The experience of the Ethiopian famine of 
the early 1980s heavily influenced the country’s Productive Safety 
Net Programme (PSNP), enabling rural poor facing food insecurity 
to become self-sufficient, and which became one of the most 
influential aid progammes in the last two decades.
Resilience refers to the anticipation of and adaptation to the risks 
of these shocks and stresses. The extent to which these risks are 
managed will determine the impact that shocks and stresses will 
have on various stakeholders and underpin their resilience to 
impacts. Taking into account vulnerability and capacity, building 
resilience can prevent crises from worsening or reduce long-term 
negative development impacts (Mitchell and Harris, 2012). An 
outcome of an ongoing process, resilience involves prevention 
and mitigation of risks, preparedness, response, and recovery 
and reconstruction (Kellett and Peters, 2014; Figure 1). Going 
beyond classic risk management, multiple risks and how they 
inform and influence each other are considered in a single context 
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), 2014). 
The Third Financing for Development (FfD) Conference in Addis 
Ababa in July 2015 recognised that current global development 
policy, financing and investment patterns need to deal with new 
risks in an increasingly interconnected world (United Nations 
(UN), 2015). The Secretary General’s report on the post-2015 
development agenda underscored this, referencing resilience in 
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Figure 1. Resilience is an outcome of an ongoing process to cope with risk
Source: Kellett and Peters, 2014
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relation to disasters, climate change, reintegration after conflict, state 
fragility, peace building and financing itself (UN, 2014). Similarly, 
the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) acknowledge resilience 
both directly and indirectly. Under Goal 1 – reducing poverty in all 
its forms everywhere – Target 1.5 suggests that by 2030, the resilience 
of the poor and those in vulnerable situations must be built, and 
their exposure and vulnerability to climate-related extreme events 
and other economic, social and environmental shocks and disasters 
reduced (United Nations General Assembly, 2015). 
With a growing recognition, in the post-2015 development agenda, of 
the need to build resilience to a broad suite of shocks, the necessary 
financing must be considered. It is imperative that this goes beyond 
Official Development Assistance (ODA) or domestic public finance 
to include all future investments, ensuring that they do not lock-in 
or introduce risks. If the anticipated $90 trillion in infrastructure 
investment over the next 15 years is not driven by low-carbon 
and climate resilient choices, the pace of climate change – and 
vulnerability to it – could increase dramatically. More remains to be 
done to ensure that all development finance (especially that spent 
in fragile and conflict-affected contexts) is risk-informed, and that 
financial flows adequately consider risks and build resilience. This 
report makes a case for financing that directly manages risk and 
builds resilience. It highlights that all forms of finance – including 
public and private, domestic and international – have a role in 
such an effort and demonstrates this through examples in key 
development themes. It ends by noting some of the operational 
aspects of how this might be achieved and development safeguarded.
Report rationale and genesis
In 2015, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
and the Swiss Government hosted a series of events around 
the financing of risk and resilience. This report is in part based 
on a set of key messages crafted from the work of a technical 
workshop featuring the involvement of experts from across 
the aid and financing worlds (see Annex II for participants). 
Subsequently, these messages were presented at a high-level 
meeting in New York and at the Addis FfD conference itself. 
Elaborating on some of these messages, this report is designed 
to influence state actors, development finance practitioners 
and private sector stakeholders. Data and examples are used 
throughout for emphasis, but this report is not a comprehensive 
analysis of the various risks, and the requirements, for building 
resilience. It does however make the case that better risk 
management and the building of resilience are imperative for 
sustainable development.
4Why finance risk management and resilience?
Shocks and stresses are inherent to development
The many health threats, climate-related disasters, conflicts and other 
related humanitarian crises make development progress – already 
complex and non-linear – more difficult to achieve and sustain (Figure 
3). These risks can damage productive assets, lives and livelihoods; 
constrain economic growth; put pressure on limited national resources 
and increase fiscal deficits; and impact health care, nutrition and 
education. They can highlight gaps in governance, or lead to collapses 
in governance in their aftermath. Acting at individual, community, 
national or even regional scale, these risks lower resilience to future 
shocks and slow development progress. 
Greater attention should be paid to making societies more resilient. 
Increasing investments in resilience would ensure that people have 
resources and capacities to better reduce, prevent, anticipate, 
absorb and adapt to a range of shocks, stresses and uncertainties 
(Bahadur et al., 2015). Stemming from multidisciplinary origins 
and despite ongoing debate around its definition and practicality 
in application (Mitchell and Harris, 2012; OECD, 2013), one of 
the strongest features of resilience is that it captures a growing 
recognition that different types of risk are interconnected, driven 
by natural, geopolitical and economic factors, and that multiple 
risks must be considered together. Understanding the risks posed 
both now and in the future, and managing and integrating these 
risks in development, peace consolidation and humanitarian 
programming, can help safeguard progress. 
Better understanding the costs of crises will shape
more appropriate responses
The costs of shocks and stresses are substantial (Figure 2). In 2014 
alone, disasters affected more than 140 million people and cost $99.2 
billion worldwide (CRED, 2014). Evidence shows that cyclones have a 
dramatic influence on national incomes and long-run development by 
supressing growth rates (Hsiang and Jina, 2014). The Ebola outbreak 
in West Africa has so far infected 28,331 people leading to 11,310 
deaths and estimated loss in output of $1.6 billion in 2015 for West 
Africa (World Bank, 2014; WHO, 2015). Syria’s ongoing conflict had 
cost the country over $200 billion by the end of 2014, or four times 
Syria’s gross domestic product (GDP) in 2010 (UNDP, 2014). These 
costs can also spread beyond the host country borders (Box 1).
Intended to save lives, alleviate suffering, and maintain and 
protect human dignity during and after emergencies, humanitarian 
expenditure is rising, reaching its highest levels in 2014 at $24.5 
billion, up from $20.5 billion in 2013 (Figure 4). This resulted 
from a greater need, a greater and wider calculation of need, and 
a failure to adequately transition out of crisis. Two thirds of 2014 
spending went to long-term recipient countries due to protracted 
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THE COSTS OF SHOCKS ARE SUBSTANTIAL AND DIVERSE
Figure 2. The costs of shocks are substantial and diverse
Source: New Scientist, 2005; UNEP, 2005; Asian Disaster Preparedness Center, 2006; UNICEF, 2014; World Bank, 2014; World Food Programme, 2014; Centre for 
Disease Control and Prevention, 2015; Oxfam, 2015; Takahashi et al., 2015; Thompson Reuters Foundation, 2015; United Nations Development Group (2015).
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Figure 3. Shocks and stresses come in many forms
6or recurrent crises and despite spending increases there was still 
a shortfall of assistance of $7.5 billion in 2014 when comparing UN 
appeals with funding raised (GHA, 2015). 
Better articulating and understanding the impacts of shocks and 
stresses allows for needs to be specifically addressed and resilience 
more proactively financed. This requires a shift in policy-making 
towards longer-term and often less visible investments as well as 
changes in the availability of response and recovery support (World 
Bank, 2013). The concept of resilience in a post-2015 agenda, 
therefore, requires stronger links between humanitarian and devel-
opment finance including in what they set out to achieve and the 
methods by which it is achieved.
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Investments in resilience reduce losses and deliver
development progress
Ultimately, proactive spending to build resilience can avoid costs 
in the longer run. Although the methods and the quality and 
consistency of data vary, case studies make a strong case for 
early investment in disaster risk reduction (DRR) for example. 
Studies have undertaken cost–benefit and probabilistic analyses 
of interventions, as well as before and after examples of 
comparable disasters showing lives and assets saved. In 2007, 
Cyclone Sidr in Bangladesh caused tidal waves and surges to 
break through coastal and river embankments; high winds and 
floods damaged housing, roads, bridges, and water and sanitation 
facilities causing electricity and communication services to fail 
and drinking water to be contaminated. Despite the strength of 
the storm, casualty rates were considerably lower than predicted, 
avoiding some of the secondary impacts on households and 
labour markets. This is credited to improved forecasting and 
warning systems, coastal afforestation projects, cyclone shelters, 
and embankments – all investments made since the devastating 
1991 cyclone. Furthermore, it was estimated that over a ten-year 
period, for every $1 invested in expanding and improving early 
warning systems in Bangladesh, $40 could be realised in benefits 
from direct damage avoidance to buildings, belongings and crops 
(Subbiah et al., 2008; Figure 5). 
Of course, there are trade-offs associated with all decisions 
including those regarding risk and resilience building. Investing 
in contingency funds and preparedness and ensuring infrastructure 
is insulated from potential hazards, for example, can mean the 
loss of those funds from other productive investments. There are 
also trade-offs to be made between strategies designed to reduce 
risk and build resilience. The scale and incidence of these costs, 
however, often depend on the timeline considered and the nature 
of benefits included. As shown above, the data on the cost–benefit 
of investments in disaster risk management, for example, are clear. 
A failure to ensure that risk and resilience investments are made 
can mean far greater financial losses later. 
Without adequate risk management and 
an explicit intention to build resilience, the 
costs of inaction will grow and there will 
be fewer incentives to grasp growth and 
development opportunities
DRR investments have been shown not only to avoid losses 
when disasters strike but also to unlock development potential 
by bolstering economic activity and producing economic, social 
and environmental co-benefits (Tanner and Rentschler, 2015). In 
part, these stem from an increase in forward-looking planning, 
long-term capital investment and entrepreneurship; all of which 
can flourish when background risks are addressed. There are 
also broader social, economic and environmental spillover 
benefits such as improvements in water supply and drainage, crop 
diversification that reduces vulnerability to poverty, and use of 
shelters for community facilities (for example, clinics or schools) 
(Tanner and Rentschler, 2015). Benefits are also likely to be found 
when building resilience to shocks other than disasters and can 
extend beyond host country borders (Box 1). Without adequate 
risk management and an explicit intention to build resilience, the 
costs of inaction will grow and there will be fewer incentives to 
grasp growth and development opportunities. 
Source: Global Humanitarian Assistance (GHA), 2015
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Box 1: The cross-border costs of conflict
resurgence in violence since 2013, is thought to have taken 
as many as 300,000 lives; internally displaced 2.7 million 
people and led to massive losses in labour and agricultural 
productivity; increased deforestation rates; closed schools; 
and increased disease and malnutrition: two thirds of children 
are thought to be stunted by hunger. It has been estimated 
associated costs to South Sudan would be between $22 billion 
and $28 billion (2015–2020). 
can take many forms. They can be macroeconomic, such as 
through the lost value of production and trade, often measured 
by reduction in GDP; or they can be direct costs of increased 
security and peacekeeping spending; or impacts on the 
informal economy and public goods (such as lower personal 
safety, health and environmental damages). 
western borders into Chad and the Central African Republic and 
ld 
save the neighbouring countries of Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, 
Tanzania and Uganda $53 billion collectively (2015–2020). This 
includes through the avoidance of a decrease in remittances – 
as residents return to home countries – an increase in refugees 
and associated spending as well as in direct costs such as those 
of security and peacekeeping. 
Sources: Frontier Economics (2015); Thompson Reuters Foundation (2015)
Only risk-informed development is sustainable
development
The Addis Ababa Action Agenda reflects on risk and resilience 
and presents a post-2015 development finance agenda that 
recognises that achieving sustainable development requires 
This is in contrast to previous FfD conferences that have largely 
reflected the thinking and major issues of the time. In 2002, 
Monterey said little about the need to target the financing of 
Today, with the looming threat of climate change and the growing 
frequency and severity of disasters and ongoing conflicts, this 
infrastructure will fail if  structures are built in seismic areas 
without adequate measures taken to reduce the impact of a 
potential earthquake. Poverty reducing strategies will fail if  they 
do not consider whether the most vulnerable live in areas of high 
risk (often the case) and how the relevant coping mechanisms and 
capacities of families and communities can be built concurrently. 
A failure to invest in inclusive institutions in a post-conflict setting 
will prolong the risk of conflict and undermine long-term stability. 
It is increasingly clear, therefore, that development will only be 
sustainable if  it is informed by considerations of risk. 
Greater consideration of how to manage risk and build resilience is 
relevant in all countries. The biggest gains, however, could be made 
in the developing world. This necessitates a critical look at the 
a complete solution, and broader sources must be employed. 
Bangladesh
Cyclone Sidr, 
2007
Disaster risk reduction measures in Bangladesh include: 
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tidal waves 5m high
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INVESTMENT IN EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS CAN REDUCE ECONOMIC LOSSESFigure 5. Investment in early warning systems can significantly reduce the costs of cyclones in Bangladesh
Source: Subbiah et al., 2008
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8The timing of finance is also important: there is a need for more 
proactive risk management allowing spending prior to shocks 
and stresses, faster delivery from all sources once shocks arise, 
and the provision of longer-term finance to support transitions 
out of crises. Overall, this means multiple risk management 
becomes a much higher priority in all development finance 
decisions. In some instances this may come with higher upfront 
costs – building road surfaces to higher technical specifications to 
withstand greater flooding or temperature extremes, for example, 
or hospitals and other public buildings to resist earthquakes – but 
in others, addressing risks could mean accepting higher asset 
maintenance costs or shorter lifespans of assets, and building assets 
in less vulnerable areas – not all of which necessarily raise costs 
(Watson and Nakhooda, forthcoming). 
Box 2: Risk and resilience in the Addis Ababa 
Action Agenda
The third Financing for Development Conference in July 
2015 in Addis Ababa delivered a strong articulation of the 
relationship between financing and resilience. Although 
hardly mentioned in an initial zero draft text, issues of risk 
and resilience reached considerable prominence in the final 
outcome document: the Addis Ababa Action Agenda. Within 
this text, paragraphs are dedicated to the importance of 
disaster and climate risk, with specific reference to fragile 
and conflict-affected countries, and to how economic shocks 
can, and frequently do, undermine development. A strong 
statement in the opening section of the agenda notes that 
“Shocks from financial and economic crises, conflict, natural 
disasters, and disease outbreaks spread rapidly in our highly 
interconnected world. Environmental degradation, climate 
change, and other environmental risks threaten to undermine 
past successes and future prospects. We need to ensure 
that our development efforts enhance resilience in the face 
of these threats” (p. 2). 
Source: UN, 2015
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Financing risk and resilience
Official Development Assistance should be targeted
to those countries most vulnerable to multiple risks 
Incidences of shock and stress are not isolated in poor, or 
even developing, countries. Such countries, however, often 
exhibit greater vulnerability to shocks and stresses; weaknesses 
in resources, governance and infrastructure can make these 
countries more susceptible to all shocks (whether financial, 
natural hazard or health related, for example) as well as less likely 
to able to recover and rebuild. Low-income developing countries, 
for example, are those most affected by disaster fatalities 
from natural hazards (Hallegatte, 2014), and over 300 million 
extremely poor are likely to be living in the 49 most hazard prone 
countries by 2030 (Shepherd et al., 2013). Seventeen of the 48 
Least Developed Countries (LDCs) have experienced conflict 
to the extent that large-scale external peacekeeping forces have 
been deployed (Manuel and Hoy, 2014). These countries are also 
those in which development progress stands to suffer most from 
a multitude of risks and also are countries within which ODA 
still plays an important role, relative to foreign direct investment 
(FDI) and remittances (Greenhill and Prizzon, 2012). Yet the 
volume of ODA to the LDCs has declined in recent years from 
51% of total ODA in 2010, or $46 billion, to 39%, or $38 billion, 
in 2014 (Figure 6; OECD, 2015a). 
The current distribution of  ODA appears to insufficiently 
reflect the vulnerabilities of  countries to a multitude of  risks 
(Figure 7). This finding has been echoed in the DRR literature. 
Kellett and Caravani (2014) consider 20 years of  ODA financing 
for DRR, finding that countries most affected by drought 
receive very little financing. Niger, Eritrea, Zimbabwe, Kenya 
and Malawi are all countries with high drought risk but have 
received just $117 million in DRR ODA combined, over the 
period 1991 to 2010. Instead they find that ODA for DRR is 
heavily concentrated in relatively few, mostly middle-income 
countries: the top ten recipients received $8 billion, while the 
remaining 144 received $5.6 billion combined. Furthermore, 
while fragile and conflict affected states are recipients of 
significant amounts of  ODA overall, it is not distributed 
evenly between countries (Box 3). 
The volume of ODA to the LDCs has declined 
in recent years from 51% of total ODA in 
2010, or $46 billion, to 39%, or $38 billion, 
in 2014
Rethinking the way in which the limited ODA available is spent is 
necessary in order to better incorporate risk and resilience. ODA 
fulfils important functions that other sources of finance cannot. 
It has, for example, assumed a role in research and development, 
capacity building and raising awareness in ways that private 
finance often cannot. Supporting what are often considered 
classic government functions, it addresses market failures and 
contributes to the provision of public goods. Therefore it is a vital 
resource for building resilience, often a public good, and in highly 
vulnerable poor countries. A balance of allocation between income 
groups, risk levels and other factors must be found to best deliver 
development progress. Such thinking is emerging (Guillaumont, 
2015) but will need to evolve substantially to reach consensus for 
aid financing. 
Source: OECD, 2015a
Figure 6. Official Development Assistance to least developed 
countries has declined in recent years
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Box 3: ODA spending in fragile and conflict affected states
While fragile and conflicted affected states have made 
development progress, they still lag behind other developing 
countries. The 50 countries and economies that are 
considered fragile and conflict affected in 2015 contain 43% of 
the people living in income poverty today (on less than $1.25/
day). Many of these countries are also vulnerable to other risks 
such as climate change. While significant amounts of ODA 
are spent in fragile and conflict affected states (Figure 8), it is 
spent unevenly between countries. Afghanistan and Iraq for 
example both receive significant flows (together amounting to 
22% of all flows to fragile states between 2003 and 2012), and 
are both within the top 20 recipients of ODA. While countries 
such as Guinea and Madagascar remain on the fragile states 
list, but receive much less ODA and have been classified as 
'aid orphans'. 
With scope for substantial development benefits, 
increased spending on risk and resilience building in fragile 
and conflict affected states could provide clear gains. In their 
2015 recommendations for ‘sustaining peace’, the High-level 
Independent Panel on Peace Operations noted a need for 
investing in preventing conflict and mediation, scaling up 
finance for the peace-building fund, establishing country-level 
financing support for political settlements, and using assessed 
– rather than voluntary – financial contributions. Scaling up
finance in fragile and conflict affected states includes ODA 
spending, but also wider peace and security spending. Much 
of the $8.27 billion considered peace-keeping financing for 
2015 is not considered ODA. These financing flows, whilst 
largely about securing and sustaining peace, should also be 
considered as contributing to the foundation of long-term 
resilience before, during and after crises.
Figure 7. Official Development Assistance should be targeted at countries most at risk
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Figure 8: Significant amounts of ODA are spent in fragile 
and conflict affected states
Source: OECD Stat, 2015Source: OECD, 2015c; UN General Assembly Security Council (2015)
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Private actors are central to delivering more
resilient development
Growing evidence shows the benefits of adopting a risk-informed 
approach in the private sector. Risks undermine productivity 
and business growth, therefore impacting on companies’ profits 
(Watson et al., 2015b; Crawford and Seidel, 2013). Following 
the 2011 floods in Thailand, 14,000 businesses were shut down 
nationwide. Car companies saw production in Malaysia, North 
America and Japan slow or halt due to the lack of parts, with 
ensuing losses of $1.25 billion to Toyota and $1.4 billion to 
Honda (ISDR, 2013). In order to secure future profits, the private 
sector must continue to manage the variety of risks that its 
business activities face. 
Private sector activities also contribute to risk-informed 
development. There are opportunities for business and investment 
in managing risk and building resilience, for example. Resilience 
and risk management products, such as insurance, create long-
term potential for new markets and growth opportunities in the 
private sector (Rockefeller Foundation, 2013). Financing of projects, 
developing and deploying technologies and innovative solutions 
(such as in food, health or logistics), or enhancing the scale and 
effectiveness of particular solutions could generate returns on 
investment as well as delivering resilience (SEI, 2009; Agrawala 
et al., 2011; Averchenkova et al., 2015). Furthermore, there are 
investment opportunities for the $110 trillion of assets held globally 
by banks and investment companies, insurance companies and 
private pensions, sovereign wealth funds, operators and developers, 
infrastructure and private equity funds, and endowments and 
foundations (Bhattacharya et al., 2015; Table 1). Similarly, 
companies may want to divest from those products that may 
become stranded or devalued as a result of risks. Many of these 
growth and investment opportunities can be found in emerging 
and developing economies and, in a virtuous cycle, a more resilient 
economy can lead to greater opportunities. 
Table 1: Institutional Investor Assets held globally in 2015
Investor class Investible assets ($ trillions)
Banks and Investment Companies 69.3
Insurance companies and private pensions 26.5
Sovereign wealth funds 6.3
Operators and developers 3.4
Infrastructure and private equity funds 2.7
Endowments and foundations 1
Total 109.2
Source: Battacharya et al., 2015; groupings based on investment motivations, 
risk appetites and regulatory restrictions on their investments.
It is unclear just how much private finance flows to addressing 
risk and building resilience. This is not only a result of a lack 
of transparency in private finance flows, but also because few 
investments in resilience are uniquely focused on resilience; they 
are integrated within broader investments. Yet it is clear that 
private finance is critical to meet the financing needs for sustainable 
development, not least because ‘the needs are huge’ and public 
finance will be insufficient (ICESDF, 2014; UNCTAD, 2015; 
Table 2). While the World Investment Outlook notes its estimates 
of investment to meet the Sustainable Development Goals, in the 
hundreds of billions, are preliminary and uncertain, it emphasises 
the scale of the financing challenge to be met. All sources of finance 
will clearly play important and complementary roles in supporting 
progress towards the SDGs.
Encouraging greater investment in resilience from the private sector 
requires reducing barriers to private investment such as over-
regulation, insufficient access to long-term finance under affordable 
terms, and a high level of real and perceived uncertainty (such as 
first mover risks and long payback periods) (Trabacchi and Mazza, 
2015). Governments have a responsibility to put appropriate policy 
and regulation in place to create an enabling environment for 
the private sector to address risk and invest in resilience, as well 
as to protect those who may bear short-term costs. In addition, 
Table 2: The investment needs in developing countries to meet the proposed Sustainable Development Goals are high
Sector Description Total annual investment required  
($ billion) between 2015 and 2030
Power Investment in generation, transmission and distribution of energy 630–950
Transport Investment in roads, airports, ports and rail 350–770
Telecommunications Investment in infrastructure (fixed lines, mobile and internet) 230–400
Water and sanitation Provision of water and sanitation to industry and households 410
Food Security and Agriculture Investment in agriculture, research, rural development, safety nets etc. 480
Climate Change mitigation Investment in relevant infrastructure, renewable energy generation, 
research and deployment of climate-friendly technologies
550–850
Climate Change adaptation Investment to cope with impact of climate change in agriculture, 
infrastructure, water management, sustainable forestry, etc.
80–120
Ecosystems and biodiversity Investment in conservation and safeguarding ecosystems, marine 
resource management, sustainable forestry, etc. 
70–210
Health Infrastructural investment, e.g. new hospital 210
Education Infrastructural investment, e.g. new schools 330
Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 2014
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governments can provide information, fund research and 
development, and form public-private partnerships to encourage 
resilience building, particularly where outcomes are public goods 
(and therefore there are incentives to free-ride on the actions of 
others). Governments must also avoid generating new risks. The 
Thai government, for example, encouraged FDI in the watershed 
of the Chao Phraya river basin through tax privileges and sectoral 
incentives before the 2011 floods. Since then, it has relocated 
industry away from flood prone areas and set up a National 
Catastrophe Insurance Fund in an attempt to reassure businesses 
and attract FDI back to the country and region (ISDR, 2013). 
Combining finance sources and tailoring delivery
to the task is necessary
It is not just the absolute amount of finance for building resilience 
that is important. In many instances, multiple sources and 
instruments of finance are necessary to achieve both the desired scale 
of finance and outcomes, each bringing different benefits (and also 
costs). Blended finance can capitalise on the expertise of multiple 
actors, for example, while different financial instruments and finance 
channels allow flexibility in timing, debt and other conditionalities 
that are fit for a particular context. Insurance, social protection 
and cash transfers are some examples where finance sources can be 
combined to suit delivery in a particular risk management context. 
Insurance is a risk transfer tool with a critical role to play at 
multiple scales and in many sectors of the economy including 
financial services, agriculture and health care (Rockefeller, 2013). 
Insurance markets exist at various scales including sovereign, 
commercial, private and micro-level, therefore varying in public 
and private finance engagement. The insurance industry has an 
incentive to manage risks, and is used to protect assets and capital 
bases and to recover from shocks by providing timely post-crisis 
finance. This can greatly reduce financial pressures following shocks 
and stresses, particularly where insurance payments are triggered 
by substantial deviation from risk models rather than reporting of 
losses (Figure 9). Building on its drought insurance product, African 
Risk Capacity (ARC), a specialised agency of the African Union, 
intends to launch a sovereign insurance product to contain future 
disease outbreaks. Its establishment would reduce reliance on the 
often-slow mobilisation of finance from humanitarian appeals 
and international development organisations, instead ensuring 
immediate funds in response to crises, rapidly executing prepared 
and vetted response activities (ARC, 2015) and contribute to greater 
macroeconomic stability. 
Catastrophe bonds can serve a similar purpose in providing 
much needed liquidity in the immediate aftermath of shocks. 
Offered by the World Bank, the Catastrophe Deferred Drawdown 
Option for example, is a development policy loan. It acts as 
a contingent credit line thus providing immediate liquidity to 
member countries of the International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development in the aftermath of a disaster. Such provision 
of immediate access to funds to governments when liquidity 
constraints are highest acts as bridge financing whilst funds from 
other sources – such as international humanitarian responses – are 
being mobilised. This can not only result in more rapid responses 
to that reduces overall costs, but can also help to provide overall 
financial stability. 
Social protection efforts in developing contexts can also deliver long-
term community and family resilience. Such policies and programmes 
work to reduce poverty, diversify livelihoods and promote inclusive 
growth, thereby enhancing the capacity of families and communities 
to manage an array of risks. The Addis Ababa Action Agenda refers 
to social protection as one of the cross-cutting areas for provision 
of basic services (UN, 2015). It provides access to resources such 
Figure 9. Catastrophic risk insurance plays a role in preparing for and recovering from shocks
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as productive investments, education and health, often to the least 
resilient in the population. These then allow then to make savings 
and invest in activities that benefit their livelihoods (Rockefeller 
Foundation, 2013). The costs of social protection schemes such as 
cash transfer are often quite small as a share of GDP and with high 
welfare gains are often affordable in all but the poorest countries 
(Figure 10). The extension of coverage or duration of programmes 
– through extraordinary payments or transfers and modification of
rules and requirements for participation – can also help post-crisis 
(Bastagli, 2014). 
In the wake of a shock, cash rather than food and non-food items can 
promote choice and empowerment, thus delivering greater resilience 
by stimulating local markets. Compared to in-kind approaches, 
using cash in emergencies has been consistently shown to be a 
more efficient way to deliver support (Cabot Venton et al., 2015). 
This is not least because the cost to aid agencies of getting cash to 
people is generally less than the cost of delivering in-kind aid. The 
benefits of cash also span many aid sectors. Goods and services that 
households are able to access as a result of cash transfers, although 
variable between households, span different aid sectors, delivering 
results that would be difficult or impossible to replicate via in-kind 
assistance. However, the overall efficiency of cash, as compared with 
other transfers, depends on the prices of commodities that recipients 
purchase in local markets, which can vary significantly over time 
and between seasons, even within countries. A good grasp of local 
context and market analysis is therefore critical. 
Figure 10. Social protection delivers long-term community and family resilience
Source: Greenhill et al., 2015
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Key post-2015 development themes in which
progress is vital
Risk-informed infrastructure investment can reduce
risk and build resilience
Infrastructure is a central component of a country’s economic growth, 
development, poverty reduction and environmental sustainability 
(Bhattacharya et al., 2015). With a typically long lifespan, any 
new investment or upgrading of infrastructure must be informed 
by current and future risk in its design and operations to decrease 
its vulnerability. Infrastructure investment must also support the 
building of resilience to society more broadly. Existing and proposed 
initiatives to boost infrastructure investment must better integrate 
multiple risk considerations to capitalise on this opportunity to 
build resilience.
Climate change provides us with an example of this. Sea-level rise 
and increased climate-related weather events pose direct threats 
to infrastructure into which resilience must be built. In addition, 
high-carbon assets could face early closure or loss in value, due 
to reduced demand, resource insecurity, climate change policies 
and regulation (Carbon Tracker Initiative and Grantham Research 
Institute on Climate Change and the Environment, 2013). This 
means that infrastructure, as a major source of greenhouse gas 
emissions and with a long lifespan (particularly in the case of energy 
and transport), must be low carbon to avoid exacerbating climate 
change. Furthermore, if an infrastructure is vulnerable to climate 
shocks and stresses, it could leave people without access to electricity, 
water, health and emergency services and so less able to recover and 
rebuild (Guthrie and Konaris, 2012; Rydge et al., 2015). Protecting an 
infrastructure from physical damage due to climate events therefore 
allows economic growth to continue in its wake. 
Over the course of the SDGs, infrastructure investment of 
$90 trillion globally is needed in cities, transport, energy, 
telecommunications, water and sanitation (NCE, 2014). An 
additional $4 trillion, or $270 million annually, would ensure this 
is low-carbon infrastructure investment (Figure 11). This estimate 
factors in both costs and savings; costs would be for more energy 
technologies required, while savings would be made through 
reduced fossil fuel capital expenditure, in electricity transmission 
and in distribution (NCE, 2014). With as much as 60% of this 
investment to be made in emerging and developing economies, 
the opportunity for infrastructure to contribute and protect 
development progress is high. Additional benefits of mitigation 
action can include: increased energy security, decreased air 
pollution, and income from reducing deforestation and restoring 
While multilateral development banks (MDBs) such as the World 
Bank and African Development Bank (ADB) have raised climate 
additional costs of 
low-carbon infrastructure
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Figure 11. Low carbon infrastructure delivers economic and development benefits
Source: Bhattacharya et al., 2015
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standards, which should filter through to the World Bank’s Global 
Infrastructure Facility (an open platform to facilitate structuring 
of complex public-private partnerships) and the ADB’s Africa50 
Infrastructure Fund (an source of funding and a platform to reduce 
bottlenecks in realising infrastructure on the continent), more 
needs to be done to specifically consider broader risk and resilience 
requirements. More recent initiatives, such as the G20’s Global 
Infrastructure Initiative, and young development banks, such as the 
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the New Development 
Bank, must adopt standards not only to improve the quality and 
delivery of infrastructure but also to adequately take risk into 
account given the lasting impacts of infrastructure on development 
trajectories.
Climate finance for adaptation can build resilience
to other shocks
Unabated climate change threatens our ability to eradicate extreme 
poverty (Granoff et al., 2014). The poor will be most heavily and 
directly impacted by reduced primary sector productivity, increasing 
exposure to climate extremes, increasing child malnutrition, higher 
airborne disease incidence and secondary impacts on child and 
female education, fertility and violence (Watson et al., 2015a; 
Gutierrez et al., 2014). Table 3 shows how millions of people 
could be pulled into poverty between 2030 and 2050 as a result of 
declining primary sector productivity, climate extremes and child 
malnutrition and stunting, under a two degrees Celsius mean 
temperature rise (Granoff et al., 2014). Responding to climate 
change to manage shocks and stresses entails both mitigation and 
adaptation measures. Under almost all scenarios, global greenhouse 
gas emissions must be net zero by 2100 to limit the temperature 
increase to two degrees Celsius, avoiding dangerous and irreversible 
change (IPCC, 2014). While developed countries need to make, on 
average, the deepest cuts against current emissions, even developing 
countries will need to reduce their forecasted emissions. Even if  
we achieve zero net emissions by 2100, the world cannot avoid 
the impacts from current and historical emissions. Adaptation is 
therefore necessary to limit climate change impacts and capitalise 
on opportunities. 
The international community has committed to mobilising $100 
billion a year by 2020, from both public and private sources, to 
address the climate-change needs of developing countries (United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Conference 
of Parties (UNFCCC COP) decision 2/CP15); however, there is 
debate on definitions and progress to this end (Bodnar et al., 2015). 
In 2014, however, the OECD and Climate Policy Initiative (CPI) 
estimated that $62 billion flowed for actions to help mitigate and 
adapt to climate change in developing countries (OECD, 2015b). Of 
this, between $2.2 billion and $2.9 billion is estimated to flow from 
dedicated climate funds, equating to pledges of over $11 billion 
since their establishment (Nakhooda et al., 2014; CFU, 2015). The 
MDBs reported spending $4.4 billion on adaptation in 2014, and 
developing countries are also investing increasing amounts of their 
own funds in climate change responses (World Bank et al., 2015; 
Bird, 2014). Several developing countries have also contributed to 
new global climate funds. Chile, Colombia, Indonesia, Mexico, 
Mongolia, Panama, Peru, and South Korea, for example, have all 
contributed to the capitalisation of the newest financial mechanism 
of the UNFCCC, the Green Climate Fund. In 2015 a number of 
new commitments have been made to scale up climate finance both 
from countries and from development banks (UNFCCC, 2015). 
Yet, while the costs of adaptation are complex to estimate, they 
fall short of what is currently available. Between 2015 and 2030, 
$80–120 billion a year could be needed in developing countries to 
meet a two degree Celsius warming target (UNCTAD, 2014).
Even if we achieve zero net emissions by 
2100, the world cannot avoid the impacts 
from current and historical emissions
The increasing flow of adaptation finance has the potential to build 
resilience to shocks and stresses beyond those caused by climate 
change. Adaptation finance from the dedicated multilateral funds, 
for example, has been programmed in a number of sectors that 
contribute to resilience more broadly (Figure 12). As an example, 
more than $405 million of adaptation finance approved for projects 
has been spent on DRR since 2002, focused on early warning 
systems, coastal infrastructure, information systems and capacity 
building (Caravani, 2015). 
Table 3: Risks of poverty from temperature rise of two degrees Celsius, 2030–2050 
Impact pathway Number of people entering poverty in a 2 degrees Celsius 
average temperature change scenario
Description
Decline in primary-
sector productivity
250–500 million people in extreme or ‘moderate’ poverty (living 
on less than $2 per day) exposed to multi-year, possibly decadal, 
set-backs to their efforts to exit extreme poverty.
Estimated impact of the decline in agricultural and livestock 
productivity are applied to the likely size and distribution of the rural 
poor in 2030 in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia.
Increased exposure 
to Climate extremes 
(drought)
An additional 100–150 million of the extreme or moderate poor 
in rural areas are pulled deeper into poverty through exposure to 
extreme drought.
Estimated impact of droughts on the livelihood of poor rural 
households by combining historic damage data, projected future 
droughts, and the likely size and distribution of the rural poor 
beginning in 2030 across regions.
Child malnutrition and 
stunting
About 120 million additional children are malnourished and 
90–120 million suffer stunting (30–40 per decade).
Estimated impact of climate change on the number of additional 
children suffering from malnourishment and stunting as a result 
of climate change over the course of each decade in sub-Saharan 
Africa and South Asia as global temperatures warm to 2.0°. 
Source: Granoff et al., 2014
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Finance in the wake of crises must support
resilience building 
Significant public resources, both domestic and international, have 
been spent on protracted crises, such as those in the Congo Basin 
or Sahel countries. In such cases, finance from all sources is critical, 
but current spending must capitalise on opportunities to build in 
more resilience to future shocks and stresses in order to deliver 
sustainable development after or during crises (Box 4). Particularly 
important in this regard is transition finance, a term used to capture 
flows of funds for recovery, reconstruction, security and peace-
building activities (OECD, 2010). Transition finance comes from a 
variety of sources, including domestic resource mobilisation and 
debt relief, yet the volumes of funds available, and the existing 
sources of transition finance and the instruments employed, remain 
fragmented and sometimes are in competition. Many post-conflict 
countries receiving funding through the UN managed humanitarian 
appeal system, are the same countries who were receiving funding 
10 years, and sometimes 20 years ago, suggesting a failure to 
transition.
Source: Climate Funds Update, 2015
CLIMATE FINANCE FOR ADAPTATION CAN DELIVER RESILIENCE 
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Figure 12. Climate finance for adaptation can deliver resilience more broadly
Box 4: Improving public health systems after the West African Ebola outbreak
The West African Ebola outbreak was the most dramatic major 
epidemic of recent times. As of December 2015 it has taken 
over 11,000 lives and infected more than 28,000 across Guinea, 
Liberia, and Sierra Leone, the three worst-affected countries. 
Many households have lost breadwinners, have fewer resources to 
invest in enterprise and savings, and have spent productive time 
caring for sick relatives and friends. Fear has led to a slowdown 
in mining operations and in trade. Schools have closed, some for 
good, as have local government buildings. Mothers are thought 
to be avoiding hospitals, and families are failing to seek pre-natal 
care such that early childhood vaccinations are falling behind. The 
economic impacts include forgone output, higher fiscal deficits, 
rising prices, lower real household incomes and greater poverty. 
The World Bank estimated that the impact on economic output was 
already as high $359 million and fiscal impacts reached $328 million 
in 2014 (World Bank, 2014). 
As the outbreak comes under greater control, it has sparked 
critical analysis of national health systems in the worst-affected 
countries and how they could be more resilient in the face of 
major shocks. In Sierra Leone it has been argued that prior to the 
outbreak, aid was too focused on private sector growth, largely 
targeted to trade liberalisation and economic policies around 
privatisation and deregulation, and not enough on building a strong 
or integrated public health system (Kentikelenis et al., 2014). 
However, a more resilient health system isn’t just about having more 
resources but about spending resources differently to avoid doing 
‘more of the same’. Building trust and legitimacy, for example, is 
necessary as evidenced by the active avoidance of health facilities 
and, in some cases, public health teams during the height of the 
outbreak, as is rethinking approaches to capacity building that have 
dominated support over the last decade (Denney et al., 2015). 
Using the momentum generated by the Ebola outbreak to 
instigate more thoughtful change towards resilient health systems 
is critical. The enormous strain of Ebola on national health systems 
has only made it more difficult for local health services to cope with 
common illnesses. 
Building a more effective health system could increase resilience 
by reducing exposure to infection and by minimising the impact of 
health ailments on livelihoods and economic development (Bloom et 
al., 2015). Investing in global health governance to support sustainable 
and rapid response programmes is necessary, as is greater health 
investment in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone (see Oxfam, 2015, 
for example), but the opportunity exists to build back a more resilient 
system that rethinks current investment approaches and priorities.
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In the case of conflict, building greater resilience through transition 
finance necessitates less-siloed support and a more critical look at 
the underlying drivers of conflict; which requires much stronger 
national government participation to succeed in delivering a 
transition towards sustainable development. Fragile and conflict-
affected states are likely to need particular financial solutions. 
This includes tailored investment such as more pooled funding 
instruments that collectively approach the risks of transition 
(OECD, 2010), social safety nets to build household resilience, 
or a move to multi-year planning cycles that navigate post-shock 
transitions. Post-shock transition is complex, but it is a vital 
link between humanitarian and development finance in fragile 
and conflict-affected countries. Above all else there needs to be a 
realistic price placed on achieving and keeping peace, a significant 
investment in long-term stability and transition, with the objective 
being the delivery of  peace and security, good governance and long-
term inclusive and stable development.
Enhancing macroeconomic stability protects
development progress
Macroeconomic stability supports stability in resource 
allocation decisions, investment and growth (World Bank, 2005). 
Correspondingly, swings in economic activity, unsustainable debt 
levels and volatility in exchange rates and financial markets strain 
public budgets and can endanger development progress (ILO et al., 
2012). The impact of Malawi’s 2001–2002 drought and floods on 
national maize production, for example, nearly brought the country 
to financial crisis. Domestic public debt increased exponentially as 
the budget had no contingencies for the food crisis that followed, 
because 50% of national diets rely on maize. The country 
ultimately spent 5% of GDP on food relief, including through 
emergency imports. Furthermore, as a result interest rates rose to 
9.1% of GDP, or 40% of domestic revenues, just two years later 
(Syroke and Nucifora, 2010).
All governments must carefully manage external public debt. Debt 
as a share of GDP has been particularly high in OECD countries 
recently (OECD, 2013). High levels of public debt are also a 
key challenge in many Small Island Developing States (SIDS), 
particularly in the Caribbean where the 2012 debt-to-GDP ratio 
was on average 70% (Figure 13). This is exacerbated by their 
vulnerability to climate change and environmental shocks that 
put additional pressures on government resources (UNDP and 
UN-OHRLLS, 2015). Policies that support investment, despite 
creating some debt, are important for all economies. Excessively 
high debt levels, however, create vulnerabilities that can amplify and 
transmit macroeconomic price shocks and can lead to sovereign 
default (OECD, 2013). Such debt levels can potentially lead to 
higher interest rates, lower credit ratings and currency devaluation 
that impose social costs, including by diverting significant budget 
resources away from other development priorities such as education 
and health spending.
There is a need to enhance the debt management capacities of 
many developing countries. This means careful evaluation of what 
debt can be taken on, under what terms and conditions, for specific 
investments. Achieving appropriate levels of public borrowing can 
also mean setting fiscal policy to reduce deficits and borrowing. 
Fiscal regulation (taxing and spending actions) and, in some 
instances, monetary policy (affecting interest rates and money in 
circulation) can also help identify threats to stability and prevent 
spread of debt-induced impacts across sectors, mitigating cyclical 
fluctuations (OECD, 2013). 
Figure 13: The debt-to-GDP ratio in Small Island Developing States 
is substantially higher than in developing countries as a whole
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Financing instruments, including those already employed by 
international development cooperation agencies and the private 
sector, have become more diversified and sophisticated over recent 
years and also can help countries to more effectively manage 
macroeconomic risk. For example, there are a range of innovative 
financing instruments that include the following: countercyclical 
lending instruments that see debt service fall or become zero for a 
specified period when a major shock occurs; GDP-linked official 
sector lending where debt service is tied to economic performance; 
local currency financing that strengthens local actors, such as 
domestic financial institutions and local governments, and reduces 
currency risk; credit guarantees to reduce or share risk; blending of 
grant financing from one entity with loans from another institution 
to reduce the cost of financing and leverage additional financing; 
green (and blue) bond financing and debt-for-nature swaps; asset-
backed Islamic financing instruments; and insurance instruments. 
Many of these financial instruments are designed to share or reduce 
risk in different ways between the parties involved and should be 
expanded post-2015. 
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How do we embed risk and resilience in
decision-making? 
Develop and employ practical tools to guide risk-
informed approaches
Assessing risks of all kinds is the bedrock of investments in 
resilience. Finance alone will not be sufficient to respond to risk 
and build resilience to shocks and stresses. Making appropriate 
decisions relies on understanding and calculating risks, itself reliant 
on good information. A key limitation in many sectors, improving 
data and impact modelling can lead to more responsive investment 
and planning decisions that choose to reduce, accept or transfer 
risks, thereby building resilience to shocks. 
There have been recent advances towards risk assessments that are 
useful in this regard. The 2014 report of the Global Facility for 
Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR) reviews best practice, 
noting the increased availability of hazard data and models and 
those for identifying, analysing and managing risks. There is also 
a growing trend for such tools and data sets to be made freely 
available. Purely technical assessments, however, are noted to fall 
short of success. The successful application of risk assessments 
requires information to be appropriately targeted to end-users and 
integrated within existing institutional processes (GFDRR, 2014). 
There also need to be incentives to deliver greater resilience. 
This can include requiring certain regulatory or non-regulatory 
standards to be met at the individual investment or portfolio level. 
A number of assessment methodologies already exist in both the 
public and private sectors for vulnerability to climate change, 
conflict, and climate-related hazards, for example. Better use 
and management of these methodologies to capture underlying 
drivers of risk, such as social, political and cross-border dynamics, 
will be important, as will establishing methods to use them in 
combination. These shared tools could then be systematically 
applied to screen investments in sustainable development for both 
the risk to that development (from issues such as conflict, disaster, 
climate) and the way in which that investment can impact on future 
development (and on those same issues.) 
Institutions have begun to make efforts to include risk in their decision-
making. The MDBs have, for example, established climate-related 
targets for their portfolios and greenhouse gas accounting tools 
(World Bank et al., 2015). These targets and tools focus attention on 
the MDBs support for conventional energy infrastructure and policies 
as well as approaches that reduce investment in carbon intensive 
industries, ultimately seeking to reduce the impacts of climate change. 
The World Bank has also committed to integrate climate and disaster 
risk considerations in all its International Development Association 
(IDA) Country Partnership Frameworks. Such measures could also 
be adopted in national and regional development banks, particularly 
those in developing and emerging economies. 
Build capacity and leadership to affect change
Delivering on risk and resilience requires a much more prominent 
place for it within discussions of financing for development. National 
capacity and national leadership is central to this end. Capacity 
includes relevant expertise and technology to develop and understand 
models of multiple risks, but also institutional capacity, specifically that 
which enables countries to adequately govern risks. This will engage 
not only relevant line ministries in countries but also financing and 
planning institutions, particularly as a risk management response will 
require the sourcing and leveraging of finance from multiple sources. 
Making such risk management and 
resilience building a priority for development 
progress is not easy, yet the public 
and private sectors alike must be held 
accountable for their investments
Leadership to deliver change is necessary to influence behaviour, power 
and the priorities of relevant stakeholders. In the Philippines, for 
example, the country’s development plan elevates disaster risk to a level 
akin to that of national security. There is a highly risk-aware culture in 
government and civil society that has led to comprehensive legislation 
and the development of key institutions to the extent that Philippines is 
often regarded as a case study of successful disaster risk reduction and 
management (Kellett and Peters, 2014). Making such risk management 
and resilience building a priority for development progress is not easy, 
yet the public and private sectors alike must be held accountable for 
their investments and any additional risks they introduce, or fail to 
take into account. It is the skills to interpret risk through to leadership, 
however, that can translate into greater action to build resilience. 
There have been a number of recent international policy processes 
through which progress is emerging. For example, the Hyogo 
Framework, the Third Financing for Development Conference and 
agreement of the SDGs have all provided international leaders with 
the opportunity to focus attention on these issues and instigate 
a process of change. Parties to the UNFCCC have also agreed to 
limit global temperature rise to 2 degrees (see Annex IV for other 
relevant commitments made at COP21). This COP21 ambition 
must translate into low-carbon, climate resilient action to lower 
the impacts of climate change. The World Humanitarian Summit 
need to capture this momentum and embed risk and resilience – and 
the means to finance measures to this end – within their outcomes. 
Recognising the interconnectedness of existing and emerging 
risks and how finance can best deliver risk-informed, resilient 
development is key to delivering on an ambitious post-2015 agenda. 
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Financing the sustainable development goals: 
the critical role of risk and resilience
Earthquakes, cyclones, droughts, conflicts, Ebola, economic crises 
and commodity price shocks. Shocks and stresses strain countries 
and communities, and set back development. For the Financing for 
Development (FfD) agenda, this issue is critical. Volatility is the 
world’s new normal.
This document is part of an ongoing project by UNDP and the 
Government of Switzerland to highlight the critical need to 
appreciate the role that shocks and stresses play in development, 
and the role of risk and resilience considerations in all forms of 
finance – public and private, national and international – play 
in achieving long-lasting sustainability. As part of this work a 
technical workshop on the 28th May 2015 in New York City. At 
this event close to 20 external experts joined a UNDP team to 
consider the latest Addis outcome document (1). This document 
builds on the results of that workshop to present a set of messages 
to Financing for Development (FfD) decision-makers. It should be 
noted that it does not represent an official opinion of either UNDP 
or the Government of Switzerland, nor the expert representatives 
who have contributed to its development.
Key messages: Overarching
Shocks and stresses are inherent to development
The development process is inherently complex and non-linear, and 
shocks and stresses are part and parcel of its progress. Development 
needs to be rethought where investments in risk and resilience are 
part of the process. This rethink demands a financial articulation.
Successful development is not ‘business as usual’
The current draft of the FFD Action Agenda document implies 
that, in our ever-more complex and inter-connected world, and the 
very ambitious nature of sustainable development goals currently 
being discussed, a different model of financing than was reached in 
the Monterey Consensus on Financing for Development is needed 
(2). That model said little about the need to target the financing of 
risk and resilience. Yet, we live in a volatile world, one where shocks 
and stresses are the new norm, and becoming more frequent and 
more severe. The human costs are high. Climate change is arguably 
the most important long-term stressor on development. There are 
human and financial implications of this new reality.
The cost of crisis needs to be articulated
The cost of crises, the cost of inaction, needs to be articulated 
by the Action Agenda. There needs to be more discussion on the 
seemingly intractable rise of humanitarian spending (which has 
now reached close more than US$24 billion a year, three times more 
than a decade earlier (3)), the challenge countries face in mobilizing 
funds during crises and shocks, or the costs of failing to transition 
out of crises situations. In 2007 the cost of conflict in Africa was 
estimated to be at least US$284 billion, representing an average 
annual loss of 15% of Gross Domestic Product (4). Similarly, some 
consideration is needed on consequential financial requirements 
arising from crisis, such as displacement (which has reached record 
levels this year at 59.5 million people, with average displaced time 
being 17 years (5)) or the impact of conflict across a border to a 
neighboring state. (Tanzania, for example, loses 0.7% of its annual 
GDP for each neighbor in conflict (6)). And more can be done to 
articulate the financial implications of 20 years of disasters (7) 
claiming 1.35 million lives and reaching up to US$3 trillion (8) in 
financial losses, or that some small island developing states lose the 
equivalent of 300% of GDP in a single disaster.
Development must be risk-informed in order for it to 
be sustainable
Achieving sustainable development will be impossible unless 
nations and communities are resilient, able to anticipate, shape 
and adapt to the many shocks and challenges they face. Firstly, 
if development investments need to be risk-informed in order to 
be sustainable, each investment can add or reduce risk. Yet many 
investments do not have as their first motive the reduction of risk.
Secondly, investments now in prevention and preparedness for 
all hazards, natural to man-made, public health or energy, will 
minimize risk and future costs. And finally, crucial for the future, 
an understanding and articulation of risk, by stripping away 
the ‘unknown’ to incentivise growth. ‘Risk-pricing’ (the extra 
investment needed to ensure risk-informed development) is 
therefore essential or ensuring we have development plans able to 
face the challenges of shocks and crises. The price of risk needs to 
be factored into all development costs and investments.
The evidence is clear: investments in resilience reduce losses 
and deliver on development
Investing in early response to drought in Kenya could save US$20 
billion over 20 years. Flood management in Mexico reduced losses 
by three times more than the needed investment costed. Yet this 
is only half the picture, since the investment in risk-informed 
development and broad resilience has much wider impacts. 
Investments in water-supply protection in Bolivia not only delivered 
14 times more value than the original investment, they also 
increased water supply,
irrigated area and household income. Such investments therefore 
help countries avoid losses, protect development and deliver co-
benefits, including the unlocking of growth potential by tackling 
‘background’ risk.
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Key messages: Financing approaches
Aid needs to be better targeted
Currently aid is highly concentrated, with 10 countries receiving 
37% of official development assistance (ODA) and the top 
20 getting 56%. The share allocated to the poorest and most 
vulnerable countries, such as least developed countries (LDCs) 
and small island states (SIDS), has come under pressure; in 2014 
bilateral aid to least developed countries fell by 16% (9). In 
addition, aid shocks are still a common occurrence, especially in 
the most fragile countries. The ‘kind’ of aid finance also matters 
for risk and resilience. For example, humanitarian financing 
(which adds little to long-term sustained development) is a sizable 
component of ODA to conflict-affected countries. The money 
that is invested in supported countries to reduce their disaster 
risk is largely spent in middle-income countries that have both 
more capacity and financial ability; over 20 years 12 of the poorest 
countries received a combined US$34.9 million on disaster risk 
reduction but US$5.6 billion of largely disaster-related emergency 
aid, one for every 160 dollars (10). Similarly drought affected sub-
Saharan African countries receive very little financing for disaster 
risk reduction at all. There needs to be a rethink in the way in which 
the limited ODA available is spent, both where and on what. 
Private sector investment is essential to deliver on development 
Resilience is as much an issue for private as it is for public financing. 
This is important for a number of reasons. Firstly, it is clear that the 
ambitious post-2015 development agenda (11) cannot be achieved 
by public finance alone, whether international or domestic. 
Secondly there is private money available that is actively looking 
for investment opportunities, such as the US$7.8 trillion of assets 
the mutual and cooperative insurance sector holds (12). Thirdly, 
the fact that between 70% and 85% of all global investment 
comes from the private sector demands attention, if we wish all 
development, for example to be truly risk-informed. Incentives for 
the private sector to responsibly focus on sustainable development 
should be a focus for the FfD Action Agenda. Financing discussions 
should focus on how private sector investments can be adequately 
leveraged towards sustainable development. This should also 
include the barriers to investment such as over-regulation, weak 
financial structure/oversight and a high level of uncertainty 
(especially in developing contexts.) How do we build the capacities 
of countries to develop and manage high quality projects? And 
what role is there for FfD in that capacity building?
Insurance has a critical role to play
The insurance sector can help countries and communities reduce 
risk, recovery from shocks and support a return to a development 
path. The mapping out of climate risks, creation of resilient supply 
chains and supporting better health are roles that the insurance 
sector can play in building resilience. Shocks can destroy asset/
capital bases – insurance can help protect those assets. Systems of 
social and financial resilience are key to protecting asset/capital 
bases from erosion on the account of crises.
Social protection delivers long-term community and 
family resilience
Social protection is a key element of community and family 
resilience, and is critical to the reduction of risk (through reduced 
vulnerability). The Addis Action Agenda refers to social protection 
as one of the cross cutting areas for provision of basic services to 
those below the poverty line. In line with this idea, promoting the 
use of crisis-linked social protection is critical since this mechanism 
provides immediate access to financial resources to least resilient 
populations.
Key messages: Thematic
Make infrastructure investments deliver on resilience, not 
contribute to risk
Effective, reliable infrastructure underpins economic activity, 
and a failure to adapt, increases the possibility of adverse 
economic impacts. Ensuring all investments are risk-informed is 
an opportunity to reduce, rather than lock-in risk. An estimated 
US$6 trillion a year is to be spent between now and 2030 on new 
infrastructure, such as for energy, roads, houses, schools, hospitals 
and other public services (13). This investment needs to not only 
be informed by risk considerations, but also support the actual 
reduction of existing risks. These investments should also support 
the transition to economies that deliver growth and contribute to 
a reduction in climate change at the same time.
Make climate central to discussions
Climate change needs to play a central role in all our global 
development discussions. A changing climate is arguably the 
largest single global risk to sustainable development, there exists a 
significant investment from the international community in climate-
related financing mechanisms, and both mitigation and adaptation 
can help deliver on sustainable development. The essential inter-
related benefit of adaptation financing in both reducing the impact 
of climate change and supporting long-term development, is 
especially important for low-income countries and SIDS. The cost 
of adapting to climate change in developing countries alone is 
estimated to be at least US$70 billion per year through to 2050 (14).
Focus on building out of crisis
Humanitarian financing is at an all-time high. Protracted crises 
last decades. Transition out of crisis appears impossible. At 
the same time there is much that can be done with sustained, 
predictable finance. Firstly, in those contexts of crisis and post-
crisis, financing can increase the resilience of communities 
and countries (including those that may be ‘hosting’) through 
investments in social safety nets and multi-year planning cycles. 
Secondly, and more importantly, financing in protracted crises 
can tackle the underlying reasons for humanitarian need through 
realistic investments in peace, security, governance and long-
term development. The financing discussions should articulate 
how fragile and conflictaffected states need particular financial 
solutions; without such tailored investment, close to 20 countries 
(and their populations) will not have sustainable development.
Enhance macro-economic stability
The impact of both internal and external shocks and stresses over 
the last ten years has proven the need for significant investments 
in macro-economic stability. On the one hand there is a need 
to enhance the debt management capacities of countries. Debt 
financing is not necessarily a negative, with it meeting urgent needs, 
maintaining fiscal stability, and creating new opportunities for 
risk-informed development; but it can also increase the risk of debt 
crises in the future. Access to the right kinds of finance is key to 
both mobilizing resources for resilience. Tools such as GDP-linked 
bonds and counter-cyclical loans are important innovations in 
financial instruments that can help reduce macroeconomic risk, and 
should be expanded post-2015.
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Key messages: Operational
Build capacity and leadership
The development of national capacity and national leadership 
is central to delivering on risk and resilience, and needs a much 
more prominent place within our future financing of sustainable 
development. Specific references that need to be emphasized 
include investments in human and institutional capacity, specifically 
capacity that enables countries to adequately govern risk (which 
includes investments in supporting institutions such as those 
responsible for financing and planning). This capacity should 
be extended to ensure the effective management and leverage 
of financial sources of all kinds towards ensuring development 
remains risk-informed.
Develop and use practical tools for risk-informed development
Investments in resilience should focus on a set of measures to ensure 
that all investments in sustainable development consider the risks 
posed to development through shocks and stress. This includes 
significant investments in the better management and usage of the 
many assessments for risk already undertaken. It should include 
the financing of comprehensive risk assessments, such as social 
and political dynamics, drivers of risk, cross-border dynamics etc. 
These shared tools should then be used much more systematically 
to screen investments in sustainable development for both the 
risk to that development (from issues such as conflict, disaster, 
climate) and the way in which that investment can impact on future 
development (and those same issues).
Tailor the channel of delivery to the task
Both the international system and national governments should 
invest in innovative ways of delivering aid and social protection. 
For example, using cash rather than food and non-food items 
in crisis situations, will promote choice and empowerment, and 
help deliver resilience through stimulating local economies and 
markets. Technology must play its part, with mobile and internet 
technology increasingly being used to finance of social protection 
and emergency aid, especially in hard-to-reach areas.
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Annex IV: Climate Finance Pledges at COP21
TAKING A CLOSER LOOK AT ADAPTATION FINANCE POST PARIS
The Paris agreement: 
• aims to keep warming well 
below 2 degrees C and aim for 
1.5 degrees, while recognising 
all countries will need to adapt 
to some climate change
• the green climate fund to 
support national adaptation 
plans 
•
adaptation and mitigation
• priorities and needs of LDCs 
and SIDS to be addressed 
• the Adaptation Committee will 
review the adequacy and 
effectiveness of adaptation 
funds increased 10%. $320 
million to the Adaptation Fund 
and Least Developed Countries 
Fund. $1.2 billion for integrated 
programs through the Green 
Climate Fund, Global Climate 
Change Alliance, and forest funds
Resilient food and agriculture: The 
Agro-Ecology Transition in 
West Africa and the 4/1000 
Initiative to increase soil carbon 
and deliver food security
New insurance programs: the 
International Cooperative & Mutual 
Insurance Federation 5-5-5 
Initiative, the G7 InsuResilience 
Initiative and the UN Secretary 
General's Climate Resilience 
Initiative
The Paris Pact on Water and
Climate Resilience, a coalition of
nations, river basin organisations,
business and civil society aiming
to direct $1 billion to increase 
water resilience
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So
ur
ce
: N
ak
ho
od
a,
 S
., 
W
at
so
n,
 C
. a
nd
 B
ar
na
rd
, S
. (
20
15
).
 C
lim
at
e 
Fi
na
nc
e 
Pl
ed
ge
s 
at
 C
O
P2
1.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
at
: w
w
w
.o
di
.o
rg
/o
pi
ni
on
/1
01
96
-i
nf
og
ra
ph
ic
-c
lim
at
e-
fin
an
ce
-p
le
dg
es
-c
op
21
-p
ar
is
 
WHAT FINANCE WAS COMMITTED AT THE PARIS CLIMATE TALKS? 
1. Analysis based on publicly available information, not comprehensive in coverage
2. Figure represents mid of reported range of $30-60 million
3. Amount represents insurance coverage rather than investment
4. Commitments of the Breakthrough Energy Coalition are linked with those of Mission Innovation
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3,400 billion in assets
committed to high
carbon divestment
26 financial institutions
representing 11,000
billion in assets adopt
Principles to Mainstream
Climate Action within
Financial Institutions
60,000
Credit Agricole

28 Report title
Shocks and stresses are part and parcel of development pathways. 
Conflict, natural hazards, climate change and their impacts on 
financial, political and trade systems can lower the resilience of 
individuals, communities and nations to future shocks and slow 
development progress. Increasing investments in resilience would 
ensure that people have the resources and capacities to better 
reduce, prevent, anticipate, absorb and adapt to a range of shocks, 
stresses and uncertainties. 
For state actors, development finance practitioners and private 
sector stakeholders, this report makes a case for financing that 
directly manages risk and builds resilience. It highlights that all 
forms of finance – including public and private, domestic and 
international – have a role in such an effort and demonstrates 
this through examples in key development themes. 
